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Michigan Law Review
Appointment of Non-Lawyer Counsel in Courts-Martial
Does Not Violate the Fifth or Sixth Amendment-
United States v. Culp
Defendant, a Marine Corps private, was charged with lar-
ceny, and naval officers who were not lawyers were appointed as
trial1 and defense counsel. The accused pleaded guilty to six specifi-
cations of larceny, and, upon trial by a special court-martial, was
given a bad conduct discharge from the service. The board of re-
1. The trial counsel is comparable to the prosecuting attorney in a civilian court.
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view, 2 on its own motion, held the guilty plea improvident and stated
that, under the sixth amendment, the accused was entitled to coun-
sel qualified in the law unless he had intelligently waived this right.
Upon certifications by the Judge Advocate General of the Navy to
the Court of Military Appeals, held, reversed. Appointment of non-
lawyer counsel who meet the requirements of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice 4 does not violate the accused's rights under the sixth
amendment. Two judges held the sixth amendment applicable to
courts-martial and satisfied by non-lawyer counsel; the third judge,
agreeing that non-lawyer counsel under the Uniform Code was ade-
quate, held that the accused derived no rights from the sixth amend-
ment. United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199 (1963).
As a Bill of Rights guarantee and an element of due process of
law, the right to counsel has been defined in the federal courts to
mean the right to be represented by a professionally trained lawyer.5
This right to counsel in civilian federal courts is expressly secured by
the sixth amendment,6 but, prior to the principal case, the right to
counsel in military courts was recognized only as an element of
"military due process."7
2. Under article 66 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 866 (1958)
(hereinafter cited as UCMJ by article), cases involving bad-conduct discharges must
be examined by the board of review as the last step of review. Prior to this step, the
officer who ordered the trial must approve the findings of a special court-martial, and
the record must be reviewed by a superior officer who exercises general court-martial
jurisdiction over the command. UCMJ art. 64.
3. UCMJ art. 67.
4. UCMJ art. 27. For general courts-martial this article requires the appointment
of trained lawyers who are certified as competent to perform as trial and defense coun-
sel. For a special court-martial the article provides as follows: "(1) if the trial counsel
is qualified to act as counsel before a general court-martial, the defense counsel de-
tailed ... must be a person similarly qualified; and (2) if the trial counsel is a judge
advocate, or a law specialist, or a member of the bar of a Federal court or the highest
court of a State, the defense counsel ... must be one of the foregoing."
5. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 462 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932); Ex parte Garland,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 379 (1866); Willis v. Hunter, 166 F.2d 721, 723 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 334 U.S. 850 (1948). But see Altmayer v. Sanford, 148 F.2d 161, 162 (5th Cir.
1945), where the court held that "the appointed counsel, being a commissioned officer
admitted to practice before a court-martial, was a competent attorney within the pur-
view of the sixth amendment," even though not a professionally trained lawyer. See
Neff, Right to Counsel in Special Courts-Martial, 34 JAG J. 58 (1962).
6. The sixth amendment states in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CoNsr.
amend. VI.
7. See, e.g., Romeo v. Squier, 133 F.2d 528 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 785
(1943); United States v. Clay, I U.S.M.C.A. 74, 1 C.M.R. 74 (1951). Chief Judge Quinn
of the United States Court of Military Appeals, adamantly holding the position that
service personnel are entitled to rights and privileges secured by the Constitution, has
defined military due process in the following manner: "It can be said, therefore that
military due process begins with the basic rights and privileges defined in the federal
constitution. It does not stop there.... Military due process is, thus, not synonymous
with federal civilian due process. It is basically that, but something more, and some-
thing different." Quinn, The United States Court of Military Appeals and Military Due
Process, 35 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 225, 232 (1961).
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Both civilian and military courts have recognized some distinc-
tions between military and civilian due process. Early decisions,
although recognizing that the right to due process is an inherent
right and not lost when an individual enters the military," defined
military due process without reference to the Constitution.9 Due
process for military personnel was held to be simply the fair applica-
tion of the principles of military law.'0 And military law, as defined
by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, provides for lawyer coun-
sel only at the general court-martial level, while imposing a balanced
abilities test for lesser courts-martial."
Notwithstanding the definition of counsel requirements by the
Uniform Code, civilian courts have recently demonstrated a tendency
to define due process in military courts in constitutional terms, al-
though applying a modified standard of due process adapted to meet
the peculiarities of the military system.'2 Similarly, the Court of
Military Appeals has recently defined military due process's and
other fundamental freedoms 14 in constitutional terms. Protection
from double jeopardy' 5 and the right to a speedy'6 and fair 7 trial,
free from command influence, have been held basic rights of mili-
tary personnel. While these fundamental elements of due process
were said to originate in the Constitution, each was in some way
8. Bums v. Lovett, 202 F.2d 335, 340-41 (D.C. Cir. 1952), aff'd sub nom. Burns v.
Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1952).
9. E.g., French v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 326, 335 (1922); Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S.
296, 304 (1910). Accord, Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 146 (1952) (Minton, J., con-
curring). The leading case decided by the Court of Military Appeals is United States
v. Clay, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 74, 1 C.M.R. 74 (1951).
10. See, e.g., Creary v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 336, 344 (1922); Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219
U.S. 296, 304 (1910); White v. Humprey, 212 F.2d 503, 507 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 900 (1954).
11. See note 4 supra.
12. See, e.g., Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142 (1952) (due process); Wade v.
Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 690 (1948) (double jeopardy). In Shapiro v. United States, 107
Ct. Cl. 650, 653, 69 F. Supp. 205, 207 (1947) (right to counsel), the court stated, "It would
seem to go without saying that these [fifth and sixth] Amendments apply as well to
military tribunals as to civil ones." Review of courts-martial in civilian courts con-
tinues to be limited to writs of habeas corpus based on jurisdiction, e.g., In re Yama-
shita, 327 U.S. 1, 8 (1945); Krivoski v. United States, 136 Ct. Cl. 813, 145 F. Supp. 239,
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 954 (1956), but jurisdiction has been found lacking when basic
constitutional guarantees of procedural fairness were denied. See, e.g., Smith v. United
States, 187 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 927 (1951); Innes v. Hiatt,
141 F.2d 664, 666 (3d Cir. 1944); Shapiro v. United States, supra. See also White v.
Humprey, 212 F.2d 503, 507 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 348 U.S. 900 (1954).
13. See Note, 64 COLuM. L. Rxv. 127 (1964), for a critical analysis of the court's
activities in the area of constitutional law.
14. United States v. Wysong, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 249, 26 C.M.R. 29 (1958) (right of
privacy); United States v. Voorhees, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 509, 16 C.M.R. 83 (1954) (freedom of
speech).
15. United States v. Ivory, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 516, 26 C.M.R. 296 (1957).
16. United States v. Batson, NCM 60-00457, 30 C.M.R. 610 (1961); United States v.
Cox, NCM 58-00496, 26 C.M.R. 764 (1957).
17. United States v. Littrice, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 487, 13 C.M.R. 43 (1953).
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modified and adapted to the court-martial system, thus perpetuating
the dichotomy between civilian and military due process. The prin-
cipal case is illustrative of this trend to recognize some rights for
military personnel that emanate from the Constitution.8
If it is assumed, as it was in the opinion of one of the judges in the
principal case,19 that the sixth amendment is not applicable to the
military establishment and that a military due process criterion was
the real, though unstated, rationale of the court, then the present
decision seems well founded. To satisfy due process, general counsel
criteria may depend upon (1) the nature of the forum, 20 (2) the ob-
jective of the proceeding,2' and a complex of other factors, including
(3) the possible obstruction of the judicial proceeding if the alleged
right to certain counsel were granted.22 Consideration of these cri-
teria as they relate to the military system of justice provides a persua-
sive argument for the position that a defendant before a court-
martial, although not provided with a lawyer for counsel, is never-
theless assured a basically fair trial-therefore due process.
First, the nature of courts-martial encourages just treatment of a
defendant. It is generally conceded that courts-martial are judicial
in nature, although they are probably not criminal courts in the full
sense of the term.23 Convened by a senior officer with limitations on
the type and composition of the court according to the gravity of the
offense charged, 24 courts-martial are ad hoc bodies empowered to try
only offenses under the Uniform Code. Courts-martial, unlike their
civilian counterparts, are paternalistic and designed to deal with the
internal affairs of the military25 when summary command discipline
is inappropriate.2 6 The maximum limits on punishment,27 the
stringent rules against self-incrimination, 28 and the elaborate sys-
tem of automatic and discretionary review2 found in military courts
18. See principal case at 217, 219.
19. See id. at 215-16.
20. In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 335 (1956).
21. Romeo v. Squier, 133 F.2d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 785 (1943).
22. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960). In addition, as stated in Hannah
v. Larche, supra, the nature of the alleged right involved in the trial may affect counsel
requirements.
23. See the decision of the Board of Review in the principal case, Edwin L. Culp,
NCM 63-00442, at 10-12 (1963). See generally Powers, Administrative Due Process in
Military Proceedings, 20 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 1 (1963).
24. UCMJ arts. 22-25. The seriousness of the offense charged determines which
military court will be convened. In order of ascending importance, courts-martial are
ranked as follows: summary, special, and general. Designation of the appropriate court
will in turn limit the officer who can convene it and the rank of those officers who
may serve upon it.
25. See Solf, Comparison of Safeguards in Civilian and Military Tribunals, 24 JAG
J. 5 (1957).
26. UCMJ art. 15.
27. UCMJ art. 56.
28. United States v. Smith, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 105, 32 C.M.R. 105 (1962); UCMJ art. 31.
29. UCMJ arts. 60-67. See note 2 supra.
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offer greater protection to a defendant before a court-martial than he
would receive in civilian courts.
Second, the objective of the special court-martial is often to fur-
ther individual discipline in a positive sense rather than to impose
punishment, and, consequently, there may be less temptation to
infringe upon the defendant's rights.30 Many of the offenses tried at
the special court-martial level, such as sleeping on watch3' or absence
from assigned duty,3 2 are unique to the military, and the objective of
the proceeding is necessarily corrective. An officer, familiar with the
diverse aspects of military life, would appear to have adequate skill
to determine whether a special court-martial offense has been com-
mitted and properly charged.83 Indeed, his familiarity with military
processes, as well as his military perspective and personal interest in
the maintenance of military justice, may compensate for a lack of
formal legal training.3 4
Third, although the system of military justice would probably be
improved by requiring that all counsel appearing before a military
court have legal training, such counsel are not practically available
in the military for assignment to every court-martial. In 1962, the
Army alone tried 26,859 cases by special court-martial.85 Further-
more, the prospect of providing lawyers for special courts-martial
during active warfare or even during peacetime for the mobile Navy
is staggering. A partial solution to the personnel problem may be
the field judiciary, in which qualified Army lawyers "ride the cir-
cuit" of military courts 6 The Navy has considered the establish-
ment of "dockside courts," which would permit ready access to
legally trained counsel.37 These proposals would help to alleviate
the burden of providing officer-lawyer counsel for every military
trial. Nevertheless, the impracticality of providing legally trained
30. The objective in the court-martial seems to be reformation of the offender. Thus,
traditional theories of punishment, such as retribution, restraint, and deterrence re-
ceive minimal attention. By not publicizing court-martial proceedings and by em-
phasizing the purpose of correction, high morale in the fighting force is maintained.
See Snedeker, The Uniform Code of Military Justice, 38 GEO. LJ. 521 (1950).
31. UCMJ art. 113.
32. UCMJ art. 86. Other military offenses without counterparts in the civilian
judicial system include: desertion (UCMJ art. 85), disrespect for superior officers (UCMJ
art. 89), failure to obey a lawful order (UCMJ art. 92), and misbehavior before the
enemy (UCMJ art. 99).
33. By implication, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), suggested these functions
as general duties of competent defense counsel. However, the ability to perform such
functions does not necessarily assure adequate investigation by one untrained in
uncovering facts of legal significance.
34. For specific definition of the duties of trial and defense counsel, see SNEDEKER,
MILrrARY JUSTICE UNDER Tm UNIFORM CODE §§ 606-07 (1953).
35. See Brief for the Judge Advocate General of the Army as Amicus Curiae, pp.
4-5, principal case.
36. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON T JUDICI ARY, 88H CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON CON-
STITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL 26-29 (Comm. Print 1963).
37. Id. at 42-45.
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counsel for every court-martial argues for the exclusion of this re-
quirement from military due process. Viewed within the totality
of the court-martial structure, non-lawyer counsel is probably able
to assure fundamental fairness to the military accused. The adminis-
tration of justice under the Uniform Code incorporates the essen-
tial elements of due process, while emphasizing the security and
order of the group to meet tactical objectives.
If the court, however, was intending to apply the sixth amend-
ment per se to courts-martial or impliedly to equate military with
civilian due process, it probably should have provided the defendant
with legally trained counsel. The sixth amendment would appear
to require legally trained counsel in a special court-martial since the
possible penalties may be as serious as those imposed for some felo-
nies in civilian courts.38 As recognized by the court,39 a bad conduct
discharge has serious consequences; in addition to barring veterans'
benefits, it has a stigmatic effect on the social and future employ-
ment opportunities of the discharged.40 Yet it can currently be im-
posed by a special court-martial composed entirely of non-lawyers.
Similarly, the standard of due process that is used in the civilian
courts would seem to require that a defendant in a court-martial
proceeding be provided legally trained counsel. The mere balancing
of unqualified counsel in a military court does not necessarily pre-
serve the rights of an accused during trial, nor does it necessarily
provide him with an adequate record for appeal.
41
There is convincing evidence, particularly as to the sixth amend-
ment, that the Bill of Rights was not originally intended to apply to
the military establishment. 42 Nevertheless, if the present administra-
tion of military justice fails to meet the requisite standard of funda-
mental fairness or if the courts persist in applying the sixth amend-
ment to courts-martial, lawyers may be required as counsel in all mili-
tary trials. Recognition of the need for trained counsel should be fol-
lowed by corrective decisions in the Court of Military Appeals, not-
withstanding the present shortage of military lawyers.48 It has been
38. It seems to be well established that a severe penalty, whether it is a denial of life
or liberty, dictates the necessity for professionally trained counsel. See note 5 supra.
39. Judge Ferguson, concurring in the principal case, questioned the competence of
laymen to practice criminal law. In view of the serious consequences of a bad-conduct
discharge, he cited lack of training and absence of a professional obligation as
serious defects in the military system. Principal case at 219-20.
40. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON TnE JuDicARY, 88TH CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON CON-
STrTUTIONAL IGHTS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL 1-2 (Comm. Print 1963).
41. See note 39 supra.
42. See Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights, 72 HARv. L. REv. 1, 49 (1958).
But cf. Henderson, Courts-Martial and the Constitution, 71 HARv. L. REv. 293, 324
(1957). Likewise, there was no intention to incorporate into the UCMJ the full pro-
cedural guarantees afforded to nonmilitary federal criminal defendants. See 95 CONG.
R c. 5718 (1949).
43. Legislative action may be forthcoming. A committee composed of the judges of
November 1964]
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forcefully stated that the availability of fundamental safeguards
should depend neither upon the military status of the accused nor
upon the designation of a military forum for trial.44 If the Court of
Military Appeals deems civilian constitutional guarantees essential
to the preservation of military justice, it seems that forthright ap-
plication of the sixth amendment, not in terminology alone but in
substance, may be required.
the Court of Military Appeals and the respective Judge Advocate Generals of the
Army, Navy, and Air Force has proposed a bill that would provide for a single-officer
special court-martial staffed by lawyers who would hear cases at the request of an ac-
cused without the presence of counsel. Subject to appropriate safeguards, the accused
could waive his hearing before members of a special court-martial, and be tried by a
law officer alone. FED. R. Cum. P. 23 provides an analogous method of disposing of
criminal cases in the federal courts. See 1962 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNrrED STATES
COURT OF MUrARY APPEALs 7-17.
44. E.g., Innes v. Hiatt, 141 F.2d 644, 666 (3d Cir. 1944). See generally Quinn,
United States Court of Military Appeals and Individual Rights in the Military Service,
35 MINN. L. REv. 491, 506 (1960); Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37
N.Y.U.L. REv. 181, 187-88 (1962).
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